International Patronage

 

IF, AS WE HAVE SEEN, THE ‘ulama skillfully drew on the opportunities created by the state’s recognition of Islam and/or of themselves to articulate their religiopolitical roles, such roles have benefited no less from international patronage from beyond the national borders. Saudi Arabia has been the source of much of such patronage, and that is my primary focus here. But other instances can also be cited. I should like, in fact, to begin with one that concerns the impact of the Azhar on the Muslims of the southern Philippines. Unlike many other Muslim societies where the ‘ulama have existed for centuries, in the Philippines the ‘ulama are a relatively recent phenomenon.127 A local nobility, the datus, had crystallized during the American colonial period to function as community leaders, ritual specialists, and local representatives of the central government—functions they continued in independent Philippines. From the 1950s, however, the Philippine Muslims were increasingly also exposed to influences from the greater Muslim world. In particular, the Egyptian government under Nasser began to sponsor substantial numbers to study at the Azhar. Thanks to this Egyptian, and later Saudi, patronage, a new, highly visible, and activist group of ‘ulama had emerged in the southern Philippines by the early 1980s”.

 

The ‘ulama—or “ustadzes,” as they were often called to distinguish them from local religious leaders, the datus—represented a new form of authority. Though madrasas had been established since the 1950s by foreign Muslim missionaries, the ustadzes established new ones where knowledge of the Arabic language was emphasized and provisions were made for extensive training in the Qur’an, hadith, and history. The ustadzes were critical of local customs and rituals, especially those attending upon marriage and death; and in opposition to the ideology of “sanctified inequality” on which the position of the datu nobility rested, theirs was a more egalitarian Islam. As in the case of the sectarian Sunni radicalism in the Punjab province of Pakistan, the ustadzes’ religious reform also meant an attack on entrenched social and economic privilege. And again as in Pakistan, the activism of the new Philippines ‘ulama was aided, in part at least, by their ties with local businessmen and urban professionals.131 The new ‘ulama were a challenge not only to the datus, however, but also to the state, with which the datus were closely allied.

 

This was particularly true with those among the ustadzes who also maintained close ties with, or became part of, the separatist Muslim struggle.

 

Since the early 1970s, this struggle had been led by the Moro National Liberation Front, but in 1984 a splinter group was established as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The latter represented a new salience of Islam and of the ‘ulama in this struggle, a greater emphasis on Islamic rather than nationalist identity, and a renewed stress on ties with the Muslim world. (Indeed, for a time, its headquarters were located in Lahore, Pakistan).

 

Though Egypt and Saudi Arabia competed in the 1960s for leadership in the Arab and Islamic world, the prestige of the Azhar was no match for the oil resources of the Saudis. Indeed, the Azhar itself has been the beneficiary of Saudi patronage. In the Philippines, though it was the Azhar that initially played a leading role in the ‘ulama’s emergence in the Muslim south, Saudi patronage has probably contributed much more over the years in sustaining the ‘ulama, their reformist endeavors, and their religiopolitical activism.133 But the Philippines is only one of the numerous instances of Saudi patronage worldwide (among other things, Saudi Arabia finances, wholly or partially, more than 1500 mosques and 200 “Islamic centers” throughout the world).

 

It is, ……..worth noting that Saudi financial support was crucial to the establishment of numerous madrasas for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The Taliban would later emerge from many of these madrasas, and Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries—the other two were Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates—to immediately recognize the Taliban as constituting the legitimate government ofAfghanistan.

 

What has been labeled “Saudi patronage” in the present discussion comes not only from the state but also from Saudi-sponsored international associations like the aforementioned Rabitat al-‘alam al-Islami or from wealthy private individuals. Such patronage has not only helped extend Saudi influence in the Muslim world, it has also directly promoted certain Saudi national interests.”

 

Excerpt From: “The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change” by Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton University Press)